TAB

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### SCURITY INFORMATION

#### LANTING CUTLINE

# STRUCTURE AND PROGRESS OF PAROX ORGANS!

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#### SPECIALIZED TRAINING BRANCH

COMMUNIST PARTY OPERATIONS COURSE
LECTURE OUTLINE

## Structure and Functions of Party Organs: Clandestine Organisation(Underground)

Like the iceberg which has seven-eighths of its bulk under water with only one-eighth visible, the strength of every CP is mainly underground and out of sight.

#### I. Introduction:

APPARATUS, which at the decisive moment should be of assistance to the Party in its duty toward revolution. (Resolved by 2nd Congress 1920)

The Communist Parties must be prepared for transition to illegal conditions. The E C C I must render the parties concerned assistance in their preparations for transition to illegal conditions. (Article 15-Constitution of the COMINTERN)

The following exempts from afficial Communist sources will elerity the problem to be discussed in this lecture.

The Official Organ of the COMINTERN—"The Communist International", on September 1, 1931, published detailed instructions on measures to be taken in a country where opposition to Communism rises to the stage of restrictive legislation,

The instructions called "Organizational Problems in Underground Revolutionary Work", by B. Vasilev quote:

"the increasing artfulness of the police apparatus of the boargeois governments in these struggles against the COMMUNICY MOVEMENT makes it essential for the latter to have more complicated, flexible and accurately functioning organization. This organization will inevitably have to rely on a STRONG CORSPIRATIVE APPARATUS, supplemented by widely adopted methods of LEGAL PARTY WORK,"

- The Farty will have to rely on a strong conspirative apparatus which will be supplemented by such open activities as may still be legal in some countries;
- 2. Although police measures may increase pressure, the legal position MUST NOT HE AHANDONED wherever it still exists.
- J. Alongwide the still legally functioning Party, AN UNDERGROUND APPARATUS MUST BE CREATED, if it does not already exist, PARALLEL to the LEGAL ORGANIZATION.

  This will enable the CLANDESTINE GROUP TO TAKE OVER DESCRIPTION when the LEGAL work becomes THEFOAL.
- 4. But the underground should not be so perfectly hidden that
  it loses contact with the toiling masses and degenerates
  into academic conspiracy. Hence, contact must be maintained

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by the community practices in Parliaments, in Municipal Bodies, Musical Court, "Athematical Societies, Sport Clubs, Preschinger Groups, etc. A New Mame Must be ready for the Party Newspaper in once it is suppressed.

- 5. All member 3 of the Perty engaged in this conspiratorial work must not AS IF THEX WERE NOT HEMBERS OF THE PARTY; in SHORET MESTINGS of the muclei the REAL NAMES OF MESSESSES SHOULD NOT BE USED, only PREDICTION.
- 6. In anticipation of bourgeois resistance to possible arrest of known leaders of the CP, a SECOND STRING of SECRET OFFICIALS MUST BE PREPARED for the underground work; safe buildings must be chosen for storing the Party archives and to HOUSE LUREGAL PRINTING PRESSED; SECRET MESTING PLACES must be chosen; CODES MORETO OUT; and a chain of EFFECTIVE STATIONS for DELIVERY OF CORRESPONDENCE—(Letter Drope)\*.
- II. In accordance with above instructions every CP in the past took appropriate measures to assure complete readiness in repression or complete suppression and/or outlawing when it must carry out functions under conditions adapted to underground activities.
  - A. Of course, every CP prefers ENALITY because:
    - 1. The ACTIFROP may be overt 9 Saily press, etc.)
    - 2. Front Organizations may be set up at will
    - 3. Ability to demonstrate drawing power during elections
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- 5. May enter the government the way of "democratic" process
- 6. Ability to marshal public opinion
- 7. Ability to obtain defense attorneys
- 8. Solicit moral support of fraternal CP's including VAP(b)
- 9. Delay transfer to illegality
- 10. Fight against paralysation by police actions, etc.
- B. All CP's are edanted to suppression and can survive because:
  - 1. An organizational eleptability and mestery over a mass of practical technicalities ( Short Mintery of the VKP(b) )
    - a. Developed GiPRE SYSTEM -- professional leaders, trained and poid by the Party
    - b. Call system become active and in tough with the MASSES
    - e. Front organisations conceal control
  - 2. <u>Packground of conspiratorial techniques</u> (knows what to do and how to go about it, Revolutionary Competence)
    - a. December against police, intelligence agencies, hestile groups and public, etc.
    - b. Offensive: Political action, etc.
  - Application of Communist theory as morale builder under suppression (too much police pressure forces masses to redical measures)
  - 4. Contralisation—control by a small group
  - 5. Endurance
- III. Prerequisites for clandestine activities:
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- A. Mess support, without which no contemplated insurrectionary action may succeed
- B. <u>Political climate</u> proveiling in a particular country; i.e., political movements in the colonies, etc.
- C. Solar system of Front Organizations to attract accessible groups, including successful solution of the conceshent problem of Party control of the organizations
- D. Setting on of CR and Intelligence organizations in relation to future Insurrectionary Action; this includes strategic seconomic intelligence
- E. Setting-up of the Military Organisation within the Security and other Porces (Secret Party Committees) Subversion
- F. Concentration on the propursment information which would elarify the intenization and concentration of the MCSTHE POWER MODIFIANCEM
- G. Plans for secretaire action against hostile individuals traitors and insecure party members, including physical elimination.
- IV. Preparations for clandestime activities (going unlerground)
  - A. Training of relatively unknown party members to take
    "front" positions within the Party (second string)
  - B. Establishment of new courier and communications systems, (instructions how to appoint liminous officers)
  - C. Preparation of false identity cards for the use of more important members, etc.

- D. Progurament of printing and reportmetion facilities
- E. "Going on vacation and not returning", etc.
- F. Security:
  - 1. Tightening of security measures from HQ to cell level
  - 2. Instructions on meetings ( how to call or cancel meetings)
  - 3. Instructions how to conduct loyalty checks of CP memabers
  - 4. Instructions how to increase general vigilance against the Government securing information on the Party; other.

#### V. Camebilities of alendestine activities:

- A. Emionase: military, political, scientific, etc.;
- B. Courier system: Couriers for transmission of resultant information to channels through which it can reach its destination:
- C. Safe houses: for personnel engaged in elondestine activities
- D. Location of new CP (slandestine) centers in neighboring countries
- E. Strikes: alou-downs, work stoppages, etc.
- F. Sabeteen of :
  - 1. Power sources
  - 2. Basic injustries
  - 3. Sources of rew materials
  - 4. Militery equipment (especially front lines equipment).
- G. Disruption of
  - 1. Power transmission

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# TO BUT HOLD TO

- 3. Communications.
- H. Arson, Germ and Chestical Martine
- I. Political Actions (and PW)
  - 1. Agitation against the actions of the government
  - 2. Creating fear and mess hysteria
  - 3. Supporting pecifies, neutralism and other similar transla
  - 4. Discrediting, confusing, and presenting government leadership
  - 5. Oresting distrust of allies, etc.

#### K. Subroratoni

- 1. Encouraging absenteeism. ets.
- 2. Pomenting violence, rece riots, etc.
- 3. Femaling disorder and inciting disobedience within the armed forces.
- 4. Creating confusion and dissatisfaction emong troops (such as giving orders for retreat)

### VI. Organizational and operational problems:

Long break down reduces PARTY into isolated NUCLEI which can only maintain their GLANDHSTINE EXISTENCE FOR THE DAY MICH.

THE PARTY MAY BE REVIVED.

FACKING OF COMEPERATORIAL EXPERIENCE—Shaped through the COMINTERN by the Soviets (Technical Apparatus) ORGBUREAU, YAVKA(Clandentime reporting place), TROIKA ( team of three) prior to 1943.

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## SECURITY INFORMATION

- A. Fundamental problem for CP going Underground

  HOW TO COMBINE HAXIMAN SHOURITY WITH MAXIMAN ACTIVITY: HOW

  TO EXPOSE ITS ACHECIES AND FUNCTIONARIES TO THE POLICE AS

  LITTLE AS POSSIBLE.
  - 1. Reduction of PARTY American —determined by the size of the Perty severity of repression; action taken within these lines:
    - a. Consolidation of Territorial Organizations;

      (region, district, subdistrict, section)

      (28 "Besirbe in Germ CP-1933 reduced to 8 interregional organizations OBERBUZIRKE)

      CELLS BROKEN INTO SMALLER GROUPS
    - b. REDUCTION OF STAFFS

      No more than 5 people, must be electic
  - 2. THE COMMAND FUNCTION (THE TRIAD SYSTEM TROOKA) on all levels from NATIONAL to CELL level.

    LIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND consisted of:
    - a. A specialist for POLISERK
    - b. A specialist for ORGINODLINE
    - o. A specialist for AGITPROP & LABOR WORK
      Sub cells—each CELL member directing three more non-members.
  - 3. COMPARTMENTALIZATION is an organization and security problem fof the FDEST ORDER to prevent POLICE from learning too much when PARTY members of functionaries are excested.

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- distinct from PARIT'S POLITICAL MECHANISM
- b. PARTY & AUXILIARI (front) (RGANIVATION

  (Youth Organizations, Momen's, etc.) remain connected

  with the PARTY through INTERLOCKING PERSONNEL ONLY.

  They function on their own as independently as possible.
- C. PARTY & AUXILIARY ILLEVAL ORGANIZATIONS

  (Teams, brigodes—for CE, International Penetration,
  terror groups are LAREGIX DUEPENDERT and SELF—
  CONTAINED CROUPS
- d. INTERNAL PARTY COMPARIMENTALIZATION (within the PARTY troper)
  - (1) ELIMINATION OF HORIZONTAL LIMISON (no contact with original structure on seme level)

    OHER VERTICAL with designated functionary

    of the superior organization.
  - (2) RETERIORION OF CONTACTS: Principle: The fower correctes a functionary or activist know; the better
  - (3) FUNCTIONAL RESTRICTIONS: The COMMADES OF
    THEE (TROIXA) MUST NOT KNOW ANITHING BUT WHAT
    REFERS TO THEIR WORK PROPER—French Instruction
    1941
  - (4) ELECTION OF PARTY COMMITTEE
    Where possible must take place in restricted

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in each a way that even the CONFERENCE members

- Election of C. Committee

  Flection abroad is ONE WAY OF CIRCUMVENTING

  SECURITY RESTRICTIONS AT HOME when the PARTY
  is underground. (Greece, Spain)
- (b) TERRITORIAL PARTY CONSTITUES 'ELECTION
  COPWISSIONS:
  - (In) Election commission chosen to be
    the PARTY for the counting of secret
    votes cast—Announces results to the
  - (2a) A SHALL ELECTION COMMISSION elected
    by the PARTY Conference elects the
    NEXT PARTY COMMITTEE, The Party
    Conference does not vote for candidates
    but elects the COMMISSION
- (a) CO-OPTATION

Elections of Party Committees replaced by or combined with CO-OPTATION (Case of YUG where cooptation was out of proportion with elections of the CO).

5. PARTY ORGANIZATE N ABROAD:

Morking from outside into "ILLEGAL" territory (Lenin in exile) Usually transferred to foreign soil are:

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## ar and Modellanda

- b. FOREIGH BUREAU (Bolehevik Party Abroad & the Massolini Era)
- c. REGISTAL SUFFORT CENTERS (OF Germany-Abenduittletungen)
- d. PARTY ORGANIZATIONS FOR EMIGRAMIS (Emigrantenleitungen)
  Couriers, border guides, etc.
- e. S ECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS: Commandeations, border crossing facilities, production of printed material
- 6. UNDERGROUND, WHILE UMAL, it normally exposes most of its make to the public eye.
  - The Comprended CADAR must be REPTACED and new personnel has to be trained:
  - a. THE CADAGE PROBLEM

Preparatory measures must be taken (Invisible Ceire) for sensitive function composed of CF leaders comparatively unknown to the police.

MET INSTANT TASK applied to the EMPIRE PARTY
STRUCTURE AUXILIARIES, TRADE UNIONS, AND OTHER
LEGAL REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS. If the PARTY
is orthogod these invisible Cadrus have esse
STRATSCRICATED PLACED AND PROPERLY TRAINED bence,
when the police seize the PARTY TREMISES, very little
of the PARTY'S activities and few of its personnal
will be revealed to them.

THE POLICICAL DEADER SHOULD NOT BE CONFECTED

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- b. An ADEQUATE CADRE RESERVE: to be able to reconstitute
  the PARTY
- c. <u>Ideological Training of the new CADRE</u> sometimes

  pushed into the background by more pressing

  operational problems
- d. THE PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL CADRE TOP FRUE LTY

### VII. ROUSING AND COMMUNICATION PROBLEM

- A. Shelter for illegal Party Functionaries, fugitives, safehouses, homes of unsuspected sympathisers, crypto-Communists, etc.
  - 1. Internal Communications— normal or TRIADS
    Reporting points (YAVKA'S)
    Letter drops

Contact points for couriers, etc.

### 2. External Communications

DORDER CROSSING MECHANISM, emerglers, bribery of officials, etc. -- eccurity considerations

- 3. REPORTING POINTS FOR JIAISON PERSONNEL from Abroad
- B. TECHNICAL APPARATUS:

Illegal Party papers, etc. Party Press.

### VIII. Security Problems

A. Personal Security, fictitious names , etc.

(To be good Communists under the present direumstances
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work, it means to understand that each failure in this respect represents danger for the PARTY and workship GRING ACCIDENT THE ACCIDENT ACCIDENT THE ACCIDENT ACCIDENT THE ACCIDENT ACCIDENT

- D. ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY storage space, PARTY records

  | Instantial records ( usually show going underground)

  NO HARD-CES \_\_PARTY HARDERS DO NOT SIGN papers with their

  But masses CHEX INTERIALS and HUMBERS ARE THED

  DIOCRAPHICAL DOCUMENTATION (CARRE)
- IX. The Financial Problem (illegal more expensive collection of dues happered, travel expenses, propaganda material, paper equipment, couriers—LCOK FOR SUPPORT FROM ABROAD (see MOPR)
- X. MASS SUPPORT (Fronts end maxiliaries) penetration and support

  The fundamental deficiency of every illegal PARTY(per Comintern)

  is that the ILLEGAL PARTY appearatus neless contact with the

  MASSES difficult—and yet, the fundamental task of the GP

  is to have close contact with the MASSES. There several methods

  by which the PARTY may ettempt to surmount this obstacle:
  - A. PUNCHRATION AND COMMON OF LEGAL NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES

    representing workers and related class elements. This has

    only limited possibilities—repression of all "progressive"

    and "liberal" parties (Fascism) or resistance by SOCIALISTS

    who lead these Parties (OF Austria versus DD Austria).
  - B. PENETRATION & CONTROL OF LEGAL TRADE UNIONS:

    Tactic recommended by the COMINTERN the penetration process
    of TU is a personent REQUIREMENT no matter what political

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C. Creation of DUMMI FRONT organisations and parties

As a rule this method has little chance—except in colonial countries where they may marshall national and colonial "liberation" movements.

### At ORGANIZATION of the C.P.T.

- A. Party Center (small, moved from city to city)

  TROIKA—directing authority (Poli-Org-PropAgit)

  RESPONSIBILITIES NATIONAL or DEPARTMENTAL

  (Illegal)—equals the——(Legal)
  - 1. POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY—overall supervision and politedue of endres
  - 2. RESPONSIBLE FOR CAPRES—supervision and protection of cadres; ration cards, identity cards and other degements to Party Militant
  - 3. TECHNICAL RESPONSIBILITY—printing materials and equipment supplies and salaries
  - A. RESPONSIBIE FOR YOUTH
  - 5. PROPAGANDA RESPONSIBILITY—editing of literature on national level
  - 6. RESPONDIBLY FOR CLANDESTINE ACTION in the PUBLIC SERVICES
  - 7. RESPONSIBLE FOR "SOLIDARITE": technique for and activities for SECOURS POPULATRE
  - 8. RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNETS
  - 9. RESPONSIBLE FOR MOMEN, LABORETES, INTER-REGION PEASANTS
    AND EMPERIPHIS

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## XV. OTHER SECRET ACTIVITIES (legal or fillegal)

- A. IntroParty communications
- B. Relations with other fraternal CP's
- C. Relations with representatives of the USSR or Satellites
- D. Perty finences
- E. Recruiting
- F. Intelligence and CE
- G. Cedre and organisation departments, membership
- H. Party Control
- I. Systematic constration into police, military, etc.
- J. Training of leaders
- K. Communicational corvicest passports, couriers, etc.

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